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This paper looks into the factors that explain FDI in Brazil by country of origin. We collected a sample of 
180 countries with and without FDI in Brazil. We use multiple estimation techniques and controls to isolate 
the effect of country political risk on outward foreign direct investment, and show that countries with lower 
level of political risk undertake more FDI in Brazil and that such negative relationship between risk and 
FDI is driven by features of the policy environment of home countries. Furthermore, we show that the 
aspect  of the  political/institutional  environment that is  most  likely  to  be  driving this negative  relation 
between  risk  and  investment  into  Brazil  is  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  national  governments.  Our 
findings broaden the understanding of the puzzling influence of political risk on FDI observed in previous 
studies, correct for sampling and selection biases, and have substantive implications for policy-design to 
attract FDI.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the major concerns of policy-makers around the world is how to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). This task is particularly complex for emerging markets 
exhibiting  high  levels  of  political  risk.  Organizations  such  as  the  United  Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development or the World Bank, among many others, have by 
now  developed  a  large  set  of  policy  recommendations  and  services  aimed  at  helping 
governments  in  this  regard.  Such  recommendations  are  anchored  in  the  burgeoning 
academic literature about the causes of FDI. The widely known internalization theory, 
developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), identified ownership and location advantages 
as the main reasons why  firms undertake  FDI.  Locational determinants, in particular, 
have received well-deserved emphasis in the literature (Dunning 1979, 1998 and 2003). 
And  among  them,  political  and  institutional  features  of  host  countries  have  played  a 
central role, including factors located both at the domestic (regime type, policy-making 
institutions, human rights records, political instability, and fiscal regimes, for example)
1 
and  the  international  levels  (trade  agreements  or  membership  in  international 
organizations).
2 The study of FDI into Latin America is no exception to this pattern: 
levels of revolutionary and protest activity, restrictions upon human and social rights, 
levels  of  political  competition  and  openness,  and  indicators  of  corruption  and  good 
governance have been shown at one time or another – in spite of lingering controversies – 
to be consequential from this point of view (Tuman and Emmert 2004; Biglaiser and 
DeRouen 2006; Montero 2008). 
                                                 
1 See, among many, Schneider and Frey (1985), Jun and Singh (1996), Henisz (2000), Jensen (2003), and 
Li and Resnick (2003).  
2 See Medvedev (2006), Kim (2007) or Büthe and Millner (2008)   4
One strand  of  this  research  on the  political  determinants  of  FDI  has revolved 
around  the  notion  of  political  risk,  generically  understood  as  the  probability  that  a 
sovereign  state  will  be  unwilling  or  unable  to  guarantee  a  favorable  business  and 
investment environment, either because of policies pursued by the state (nationalizations, 
blocking  of  fund  remittance,  and  other  abrupt  policy  changes)  or  because  of  events 
outside its control (instability, social unrest, and other aspects of the political and social 
environment).
3 Empirical studies have for long shown that levels of political risk in host 
countries  are  highly  consequential  for  FDI.  Nigh  (1986)
  and  Nigh  and  Schollammer 
(1987)  assess  the  influence  of  political  risk  by  emphasizing  conflict  and  cooperation 
among  recipients  and  investors,  and  conclude  that  cooperation  between  nation  states 
stimulates FDI. Butler and Joaquin (1998) show that multinationals require a higher rate 
of return to undertake FDI in politically risky countries. Bevan and Estrin (2004) and 
Janicki and Wunnava (2004) show that country risk has a significant impact on foreign 
investment  decisions,  while  Le  and  Zak  (2006)  show  that  host  country  political  risk 
promotes capital flight. In the case of Latin American countries, hypotheses related to the 
negative impact of variables related to political risk have been tested and confirmed in 
various studies (see, for example, Tuman and Emmert 2004 and Biglaiser and DeRouen 
2006).
4  
One common feature of most of this research on political risk and FDI, however, 
is its focus on the host countries and why their risk levels may explain why some of them 
seem to be more attractive to investors than others. A rather different question concerns 
the  attributes of  countries-of-origin  and  how  they  may  explain  investment  flows  into 
                                                 
3 See Kobrin (1979) for a seminal discussion of the concept. 
4 See also Montero (2008), Tuman (2009) and Montero (2009) for a debate about the specific aspects of the 
political and institutional environment of host countries that affect investment in Latin America.   5
particular  countries.  Scholars  focusing  on  Eastern  Europe  and  Latin  America,  for 
example, have often remarked on how national differences between home countries may 
lead to different investment patterns (Hunya 2000; Tuman 2006; Tuman 2009; Montero 
2009), but research on country-of-origin effects remains scarce (see Deichmann 2010 for 
a review of the empirical studies). Even scarcer are those studies that explicitly address 
the question of political risk in home countries, and why it may turn those countries’ 
firms into more likely investors in a particular country. Such question has seldom been 
examined  in  the  literature,  and  the  few  existing  studies  that  address  it  have  raised 
important theoretical and empirical puzzles.  
First, the main theoretical argument advanced in these few studies is that firms in 
countries  with  higher  levels  of  political  risk  should  have  greater  incentives  to  invest 
abroad, to reduce the uncertainty in returns created by a hostile domestic environment. 
However, there are at least two reasons why that argument may fail to find empirical 
support.  On  the  one  hand,  as  Thomas  and  Grosse  (2001)  note,  such  argument  was 
originally developed and tested in the study of the United States as the host country 
(Tallman 1988; Grosse and Trevino 1996), and is less plausible in cases where the host 
economies under study are themselves countries with higher levels of political risk than 
the U.S. On the other hand, as we will develop later, there are even reasons to believe that 
the relation between home country political risk and FDI might be opposite to the one 
which has been most frequently hypothesized, due to firms’ greater access to capital and 
outward investment friendly policies in lower risk countries. Unsurprisingly, given these 
arguments, several contradictory findings coexist in studies of host countries other than 
the U.S. Thomas and Grosse (2001) find a positive effect of home country risk in FDI   6
into Mexico in one model specification, a result similar to that obtained by Zhao (2003) 
for China. Liu et al. (1997), however, fail to find empirical support for that hypothesis for 
the Chinese case, while Deichmann (2010) finds that, contrary to initial expectations, 
countries with lower (rather than higher) levels of corruption tend to invest more in the 
Czech Republic. Thus, although focusing on a single FDI destination crucially allows 
control for host country effects that might confound estimations of the effect of country-
of-origin attributes, expanding our knowledge about the relationship between levels of 
political risk in the countries-of origin and FDI in a wider variety of host countries seems 
necessary in order to continue evaluating the generalizability of existing arguments and 
findings.  
Second, extant studies of the effects of home countries’ political risk on FDI have, 
in most cases, resorted to summary measures of such risk, as evaluated by consultant 
firms and country experts and made publicly available in specialized publications and 
reports.  Such  measures  are  extremely  important  when  studying  the  impact  of  host 
countries’ political risk on FDI, as they are precisely among the most likely sources of 
consequential  information  for  decision-makers  in  firms.  However,  as  Kobrin  (1979) 
noted early on in this literature, such measures may conflate and confuse a variety of 
different non-economic factors, from the mere likelihood of interference of governments 
with business transactions to large-scale factors of instability in the political environment, 
such  as  the  likelihood  of  political  conflict,  upheaval,  violence,  and  political  regime-
change. In the existing literature on host country determinants of FDI, considerable effort 
has  been  made  in  “unpacking”  political  risk  into  its  different  components  and  in 
distinguishing it from other political factors that may in fact operate in directions opposite   7
to those hypothesized concerning “risk”, with several studies on Latin America serving as 
prominent examples of that effort (Tuman and Emmert 2004; Biglaiser and DeRouen 
2006; Montero 2008). The same effort, however, has not been made concerning political 
risk  in  home  countries.  In  this  article,  after  estimating  the  effects  of  home  country 
political  risk  as  captured  by  a  well-known  summary  measure,  we  try  precisely  to 
“unpack”  that  notion  and  to  differentiate  it  from  other  aspects  of  the  political 
environment. 
Third, the existing studies dealing with the consequences of home country risk 
have  mostly  used  panel  designs  and  restricted  their  set  of  countries-of-origin  to  the 
Western nations or to the larger set of countries that have actually invested in a particular 
host country. Admittedly, the kind of approach used so far has the advantage of capturing 
the  dynamical  aspects  of  the  investments.  However,  it  contains  a  potentially  crucial 
disadvantage: the use of data exclusively from the countries that have invested in a host 
country under examination creates a potential selection bias problem that may seriously 
affect  the  estimates.  We  address  this  problem  by  using  cross-sectional  data  on  180 
countries, including those with positive and those with zero FDI in Brazil. However, the 
presence  of  countries  with  zero  FDI  in  Brazil  renders  the  typical  OLS  estimates 
inadequate. We thus use Tobit and Heckit (and the associated Probit auxiliary regression) 
selection models to estimate the parameters. Although not impossible, the estimation of 
these types of models with panel data is a quite daunting task and the reliability of the 
estimates is questionable (e.g. see Hu 2002 and Nicoletti 2006). 
In this article, we focus our analysis on the case of Brazil. As far as we know, this 
is a country that has never been approached from the perspective of a systematic test of   8
country-of-origin determinants of FDI. However, like China or Mexico, Brazil clearly 
stands out in the spectrum of countries attracting large amounts of FDI in recent years, 
having consistently captured, since the mid-1990s, more than 10% of the world’s FDI 
flow to emerging markets, and becoming the recipient of about half of Latin America’s 
inflow (UNCTAD, 2009b). And also like China and Mexico (and the Czech Republic), 
Brazil is an emerging market with levels of risk that allow us to test the generalizability 
of findings originally obtained in the study of a low-risk country such as the U.S.  
Our findings show countries with lower – rather than higher – levels of political 
risk tend to invest more in Brazil, and that this effect takes place above and beyond that 
of other economic variables with which political risk is likely to be highly correlated, 
such  as  economic  development.  This  finding  is  at  odds  not  only  with  the  results 
documented by Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino (1996) regarding FDI into the 
U.S. but also with the results from Thomas and Grosse (2001) and Zhao (2003) for the 
emerging  markets  of  Mexico  and  China.  We  thus  show  that  their  results  showing  a 
positive effect of political risk on FDI cannot be generalized when focusing in other host 
countries  and  when  we  use  estimation  techniques  that  are  appropriate  to  deal  with 
selection  bias  and  the  existence  of  home  countries  with  zero  investment  into  host 
countries. Furthermore, we show that the aspect of the political/institutional environment 
that is most likely to be driving this negative relation between risk and investment into 
Brazil is related to the effectiveness of national governments, i.e., with the quality of civil 
and public services, policy formulation, and government commitment to good policies. In 
other words, our findings also contribute to illuminate what has been a somewhat obscure   9
relationship between FDI and aggregate measures of political risk, collapsing dimensions 
that range from regime type and stability to the quality of domestic policies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the 
case of Brazil and importance of FDI in this emerging market. In Section 3 we define our 
hypotheses,  the  choice  of  variables,  and  the  econometric  approach.  In  section  4,  we 
discuss  empirical  issues  and  present  our  econometric  findings,  both  in  terms  of  the 
relationship between host country risk – and other relevant control variables – and FDI 
and in terms of the particular component of the political and institutional environment 
driving such relationship. We summarize the study and its main conclusions in Section 5.  
 
1. FDI in Brazil 
 
Emerging markets that are more volatile than those in North America or Western 
Europe are now attracting considerable FDI. Over the last 20 years, there has been an 
almost  tenfold  increase  in  FDI  in  emerging  markets.  Brazil  is  one  of  the  stellar 
performers among them. Foreign investment began to gain importance in Brazil in the 
late 19th century, especially through British investments in services such as railroad and 
maritime transportation. Later, the state took over the provision of many public services 
following unilateral government decisions or negotiation with foreign investors, and FDI 
only regained prominence after the Second World War, though without a marked bias 
from any particular country. 
The crisis of the 1980s practically wiped Brazil off the FDI map. On average, the 
annual net inflow of FDI to the country dropped from US$ 2.3 billion between 1971 and 
1981 to a mere US$ 357 million from 1982 to 1991. However, the 1990s, especially since   10
the middle of the decade, marked Brazil’s return as a relevant destination of FDI among 
developing countries. Brazil received about US$ 2 billion a year in FDI between 1990 
and 1995, which corresponded to 0.9% of the world’s FDI flow and to 2.7% of the flow 
to developing countries. The FDI destined for Brazil in 1996 was five times higher than 
the annual average for the first half of the decade. That inflow to Brazil continued to 
grow until  2000,  when  it totaled  US$  32.8  billion. Even  though  it subsequently  fell, 
foreign investment in Brazil in 2001 (US$ 21 billion) already amounted to 3% of the 
world  total  and  11%  of  that  received  by  developing  countries,  and  has  since  then 
recovered back to a record US$ 45 billion in 2008. And while the recent global economic 
financial and economic crisis has led to a contraction of about 50% in global FDI flows in 
the first half of 2009, Brazil was precisely one of the emerging markets where that drop 
was smallest, of about only 25%, compared to 49%  globally and  more than 30% on 
average in Latin America (see Kekic 2009). 
Brazil holds a portfolio of diversified interests in geographical terms, but there 
seems to be, at least since the mid-1990s, a marked concentration from the advanced 
industrial economies. According to 1995 data on FDI stock, the US consolidated itself as 
Brazil’s  leading  investor  over  the  years,  accounting  for  28%  of  the  total  FDI  stock, 
followed by Germany (10.8%), Japan (9.6%) and Switzerland (6.6%). At the time, the 
European Union as a whole was responsible for about one third of total stock. In 2001, a 
mere eleven countries accounted for about 90% of foreign investment in Brazil: the US 
continued to predominate with 25%, followed by Spain with 15%,  France with 11%, 
Netherlands with 10%, Portugal with 9%, Germany with 6% and Japan with 5%, while 
Canada, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom had a 2% share. That overall share   11
for the major 11 countries has since dwindled a little, dropping to 75% in 2005, but has 
remained mostly stable until today. Even a case like Mexico, which was the origin of 8% 
of  all  foreign  investment  in  Brazil  in  2005,  has  since  then  dropped  to  lower  shares, 
reaching no more than 0.5% in 2008.
5 Thus, from a purely descriptive point of view, it 
does seem clear that the lion share of FDI inflows remains solidly the responsibility of 
firms from low-risk countries. However, whether home country political risk is indeed a 
factor in explaining Brazilian FDI inflows requires a multivariate approach. We explain 
the details of that approach, the basic research hypotheses and the data employed in the 
following section. 
 
2. Hypotheses, Data and Method 
2.1 Political risk and FDI 
 
The main goal of this paper is to assess the influence of home country political 
risk on FDI. Both Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino (1996) concluded that, ceteris 
paribus, investors from riskier countries are more likely to invest in the United States, a 
low-risk  country.  The  rationale  can  be  simply  expressed.  As  Tallman  puts  it,  while 
“increased  conflict  at  home  results  in  a  national  environment  that  threatens  private 
investment (…), a cooperative home country political environment improves conditions 
for  domestic  investment  and  thus  tends  to  reduce  the  incentives  for  overseas  direct 
investment”  (Tallman  1988:  220).  However,  Brazil  has  obviously  rather  different 
characteristics from the US. Although there have been marked improvements in terms of 
the stability of the political and macroeconomic environment in most Latin American 
                                                 
5 Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Available at: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INVEDIR    12
countries,  Brazil  still  ranked  69
th  in  Euromoney’s  2005  country  risk  index,  below 
countries  like  Egypt  and  Kazakhstan,  and  20  places  below  Mexico.  By  2008,  it  had 
climbed to the 60
th place, while Mexico ranked at 54
th and Chile at 40
th. In any case, 
Brazil can hardly be considered a safe haven from the FDI point of view.  
This leads us to contradictory expectations about the way in which home country 
risk  might  affect  FDI  into  Brazil.  It  is  certainly  conceivable  that  firms  operating  in 
countries with higher internal political instability have, ceteris paribus, higher incentives 
to  internationalize,  as  they  seek  to  escape  domestic  instability.  However,  it  is  also 
possible  that  this  reasoning  applies  much  less  clearly  to  the  case  of  higher  risk  and 
developing host economies such as Mexico, China or Brazil that it does to the case of the 
U.S. First, as Thomas and Grosse (2001) point out, in these cases, “political risk at home 
may not encourage firms to look at another risky country for FDI and local production” 
(2001: 66). Thus, the hypothesized positive relationship between risk at home and FDI is 
disturbed  by  the  possibility  that  returns  to  foreign  investment  are  also  endangered  if 
potential host countries themselves exhibit, contrary to the U.S., high levels of political 
instability.  Second,  calculations  concerning  risks  when  investing  in  developing 
economies are  likely  to be  different from  those  involved  in  investing  and  richer  and 
developed countries. For example, as Albuquerque (2003) notes, one potentially relevant 
aspect of investing in emerging markets - such as, say, Mexico, China, or Brazil - is that 
developing  countries  are  likely  to  be  much  more  dependent  on  the  multinational 
companies themselves to obtain the human capital, technology, advertising and marketing 
resources,  and  other  intangible  assets  required  to  maximize  returns  on  investments. 
Therefore, as these assets are largely inalienable, they give firms in home countries a   13
higher  risk  sharing  advantage  than  they  would  if  investment  took  place  in  more 
developed countries.  
Besides, there are reasons to believe that the relationship between risk and FDI 
may be not only disturbed when looking at host emerging markets but even reversed 
altogether. Low risk at home can be seen as something that removes obstacles and create 
incentives to foreign investment. Firms operating in countries with high levels of risk are 
likely to have less capital to invest. At the most fundamental level, country risk ratings 
indicate the likelihood that a country will default on debts, and thus firms in countries 
where risk is perceived to be higher will face greater credit spreads (Eichengreen and 
Mody 2000) and greater difficulties in accessing world debt markets. In contrast, firms 
operating in lower risk countries will have more access to those markets and to the risk 
capital they need to fund FDI. Furthermore, to the extent that “political risk” captures (the 
lack of) good governance and of a stable market-friendly policy environment, firms in 
lower risk countries may even enjoy greater political support to their business expansion 
overseas, in the form of reduced restrictions to the establishment of subsidiaries or even 
of explicit financial, diplomatic, and informational support. It is probably not by chance 
that,  overall,  in  spite  of  the  lingering  discussion  about  the  benefits  of  FDI  to  home 
economies, the prevailing view among developed nations has become that the benefits of 
outward  investment  tend  to  outweigh  costs,  resulting  in  explicit  government  policies 
generally favorable to such outward investment (Kokko 2006).  
Thus, on the basis of the existing literature, empirical findings (positive, negative, 
and no effects) and theoretical arguments, our expectations about the impact of home   14
country risk and FDI are contradictory, and it is unclear what we should find in terms of 
the relationship between the two variables: 
H.1: The relation between home country political risk and FDI is 
unclear.  
We analyze the impact of home country political risk on FDI resorting to two 
main data sources. The dependent variable, FDI in Brazil by country of origin in US 
dollars, is made available by the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil), and is 
measured,  for  2005,  for  180  countries  in  the  world.  For  political  risk,  we  use  the 
Euromoney country risk index, also for 2005.
6 The main advantage of this index is that it 
is available for all the countries in our dataset. The index is a sum of several specific risks 
(like political risk, economic performance, credit ratings, etc, with pair wise correlations 
above 0.90). Using more than one would introduce obvious multicollinearity problems. 
We thus focus on the specific political risk index. The index’s value ranges from 0 to 25, 
and it is built in such a way that higher values correspond to lower country risk levels. 
While we tried other measures of risk in the model, the statistically most significant one 
was the political risk (even more than the economic performance risk). Other than that, 
the results were very similar. 
 
3.2 Other hypotheses and variables 
 
The  remaining  variables  -  all  measured  for  2005  for  the  180  countries  under 
examination (see the appendix for a list of countries) - employed in the model are used as 
controls. First, the larger the economic size of a country, the larger the number and the 
                                                 
6 See Cosset and Roy (1991) for a study of the Euromoney country risk ratings, as well as of another rating 
(Institutional Investor) also used in the literature on home country risk (Liu et al. 1998).   15
size of the domestic firms that can invest abroad (Markusen, 1990). Naturally, under this 
basic and broadly supported “market size” hypothesis, we expect the relation between the 
size of the domestic market and FDI into Brazil to be positive. We include two variables 
that serve as proxies for the economic size of a country: gross domestic product (GDP) 
and total accumulated direct investment abroad (DIA). GDP is a good measure of the 
domestic economic dimension of the home country, and with DIA, we expect to measure 
the international presence of each country. We used the UNCTAD database to collect 
data on GDP and DIA. 
H.2:  The  relation  between  economic  output  of  the  domestic 
country and FDI into Brazil will be positive. 
It  also  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  FDI  would  be  greater  for  wealthier 
economies. Economically developed countries with wealthier domestic markets are able 
to generate more capital for risky investments, are endowed with greater resources and 
capacities and thus more apt to internationalize. We therefore expect the wealth of the 
domestic  market  to  affect  the  amount  of  manufacturing  investment  abroad  (Vernon, 
1966), a finding confirmed by Tallman’s (1988) study of FDI inflows in the United States 
(albeit Grosse and Trevino 1996 find no effects of GDP per capita). GDP per capita is 
used as a proxy for the wealth of a country.
7 We use the UNCTAD database as our 
source.  
H.3: The relation between domestic wealth and FDI in Brazil will 
be positive.  
                                                 
7 We also considered the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a broader measure of the 
development of a country, but the results are very similar and, therefore, not reported for the sake of 
brevity.   16
Firms that invest in foreign markets are said to be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis local 
firms due to scarcer knowledge of the local business conditions (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2001). Cultural proximity reduces the disadvantage of foreign firms operating abroad in 
other words and diminishes the cost of adapting to the local business conditions. Thus, 
countries  with  greater  cultural  proximity  to  Brazil  should  be  more  likely  to  invest. 
Unfortunately, indices of cultural proximity that have been used in other studies (Kogut 
and  Singh  1988)  are  not  available  for  more  than  70  countries.  For  this  reason,  we 
constructed cultural distance proxies through dummies for language. The native language 
in Brazil is Portuguese. We divided the languages between Portuguese, Spanish, English 
and others, because the first two are very similar and English is the most spoken second 
language, and conceive Portuguese and Spanish languages as capturing greater cultural 
proximity with Brazil.
8 We collected information for these variables in the CIA World 
Factbook.  
H.4: The relation between cultural proximity and FDI in Brazil 
will be positive. 
The  geographical  distance  between  the  home  country  and  Brazil  can  also 
influence the decision to invest, due to the lower cost of monitoring foreign affiliates and 
establishing operations in nearby countries. To measure the distance between Brazil and 
another country, we consider the distance in kilometers between countries’ capitals. We 
used software developed by Byers (2003) to estimate these distances. 
H.5:  The  relation  between  geographical  distance  and  FDI  in 
Brazil will be negative. 
                                                 
8 We also constructed proxy variables based on religion. As Brazil is largely Catholic, we divided religion 
into  three  groups:  Catholic,  other  Christians  and  other  religions.  However,  these  variables  proved 
statistically insignificant in all estimations and therefore we excluded them from the analysis.   17
International trade  and foreign investment are often viewed as  complementary 
(Balassa, 1985). Following the results of previous studies, we expect higher exports to 
Brazil to be linked to higher levels of FDI. To measure bilateral trade, we add the value 
of exports and imports of each country with Brazil. Data is available at the Ministry for 
Development, Industry and International Trade of Brazil (Ministério do Desenvolvimento, 
Indústria e Comércio Exterior). 
H.6:  The  relation  between  bilateral  trade  (home  country  and 
Brazil) and FDI in Brazil will be positive. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the data set 
    Mean   Median   Maximum 
 
Minimum   Std. Dev.  Obs.   Unit  Source 
FDI  109  0.0  4,644  0  480.4  184  10
6 US Dollars  Central Bank of Brazil 
Political Risk  12.1  10.9  25  0  6.5  184  Index  Euromoney 
GDP pc  9,646  2,795  80,062  101.4  15,060  184  10
3 US Dollars  UNCTAD 
Portuguese  0.032  0  1  0  0.18  184  Binary  CIA - The World Factbook  
Spanish  0.114  0  1  0  0.32  184  Binary  CIA - The World Factbook  
English  0.273  0  1  0  0.45  184  Binary  CIA - The World Factbook  
Distance  9,505  9,401  18,803  1,461  4,178  183  Kilometers  Byers (2003) 
Trade  4.78E+08  1.53E+07  1.605E+10  0  1.55E+09  184  US Dollars  Government of Brasil 
GDP  240,956  15,089  12,484,364  70.98  1,046,568  183  10
6 US Dollars  UNCTAD 
DIA  4,528  7.45  142,925  -33.171  17,816  181  10^6 US Dollars  UNCTAD 
 
3.3 Research methodology 
 
We estimate a model that is a function of the stated variables: 
    =    
		
         	    (±),   (+),   (+),     (+),          (+),
      ℎ(+),      ℎ(+),       	        (−),         	     (−)
		
  
About one hundred countries included in our dataset have not invested in Brazil. 
This means that, in our analysis, we include potential foreign investors in Brazil, instead   18
of  considering  only  countries  with  positive  investments.  Tallman  (1988),  Grosse  and 
Trevino (1996), Liu et al. (1997), Thomas and Grosse (2001), and Zhao (2003) have used 
in  their  datasets  only  countries  that  have  invested  in  the  host  country  under  study. 
Therefore, it is possible that sample selection bias is affecting their results. However, the 
inclusion of countries with no FDI renders the typical OLS estimates inadequate. If we 
eliminate  the  countries  with  zero  investment  in  Brazil,  the  OLS  estimates  will  be 
inconsistent (see for example Greene, 2008). We need therefore a different estimation 
strategy. 
We can think of FDI as a two-step decision. First, firms decide whether to invest 
in Brazil or not. Then, if they decide to invest, they have to decide on the size of FDI. We 
model  the  decision  with  Heckman  (1979)’s  selection  model.  The  Heckman  sample 





    = 1																																																				  	  
∗ > 0
   = 0																																																				  	  
∗ ≤ 0 	
  
∗ =     +   																																																							
   =     +   						        	    		  	  
∗ > 0	
,        (1) 
where zi* is the latent dependent variable. If positive, there is investment (z = 1), 
if negative, there is no investment (z = 0). wi is the vector of the independent variables 
that influence the decision of whether to invest in Brazil, γ is the vector of coefficients, 
and the ei’s are assumed to be independently normally distributed. If z = 1, then the last 
equation determines how much is invested. 
The idea behind equation (1), is that firms first decide if they want to invest in 
Brazil   or not  . We use a Probit model to estimate this step. Then, only if 
they decide to invest, they decide on the size (y). 
( ) 1 = z ( ) 0 = z  19
We also consider an alternative approach: the Tobit model (Tobin 1958), which 
can be described as follows: 
 
  
∗ =     +   																																										
   =   
∗																																				  	  
∗ > 0
   = 0																																						  	  
∗ ≤ 0	
,           (2) 
where yi* is the latent dependent variable, yi is the observed dependent variable, xi 
is the vector of the independent variables,   is the vector of coefficients, and the ui’s are 
assumed to be independently normally distributed.  
Whereas  the  Tobit  was  designed  to  deal  with  estimation  bias  associated  with 
censoring, the Heckit -  is a response to sample selection bias. The two models have 
different motivations. The rationale behind equation (2) is that firms choose how much to 
invest in Brazil (y*), but choices below zero are censored, because it is not possible to 
invest less than nothing. Therefore, we do not observe   
Overall,  we  estimate  three  different  models:  a  Probit  model,  a  Heckit  model, 
which uses the Probit results to deal with the sample selection bias, and the Tobit model.  
   
b
0. y <  20
3. Findings 
4.1 Main Results 
 
We report the Tobit, Heckit and the Probit auxiliary selection model in Table 2. 
We can see that the estimations are remarkably similar, giving us additional confidence 
about  the results.  Our  “market size”  variables  –  GDP  and  DIA  – have,  as  expected, 
positive  and  comfortably  significant  effects.  GDP  per  capita  is  not  statistically 
significant, contradicting Tallman (1988) but replicating Grosse and Trevino’s (1996) 
negative finding. Contrary to expectations, the estimated coefficient of bilateral trade is, 
albeit  positive,  statistically  not  significant.  Variables  measuring  distance  have  the 
expected signs: Portuguese and Spanish speaking countries have a greater propensity to 
invest in Brazil; and geographic distance appears with the expected sign, although the 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 10% level only if we consider a one-
tailed test. This may occur because Brazil’s neighboring countries speak Spanish, and the 
Spanish language dummy may therefore be capturing part of its effect. In general, the 
results of previous studies (Grosse and Trevino 1996; Thomas and Grosse 2001; and for 
cultural  distance,  Liu  et  al.  1997)  are  confirmed  in  this  respect:  the  cultural  and 
geographic proximity of the countries increases the propensity to invest abroad.  
Noting that our control variables behave generally as expected, we can focus on 
our core finding. That finding is that the estimated coefficient of political risk is positive 
and statistically very significant. Recall that, in the Euromoney political risk index, higher 
values correspond to lower levels of political risk. This means that, substantively, our 
basic finding is that countries with lower risk levels tend to invest more into Brazil. The 
magnitude of the effect is large and important: a one standard deviation positive change   21
in the political risk index ― equivalent, for example, to the difference between a country 
like Bulgaria and a country like South  Korea on the 2005 data – is associated to an 
increase in US$ 210 million in foreign investment. This finding contrasts with most of the 
existing literature on the effects of home country political risk in FDI flows, and lends 
credibility to the notion that the relationship between the two variables is different when 
we move from low risk developed host countries to high risk host emerging markets. 
Firms in high risk countries may look at lower risk countries as safer havens, but it is in 













Table 2 ─ Regression results on FDI in Brazil
9 
                                                 
9 If we had used Huber/White Standard errors to account for the possibility of heteroscedasticity, the results 
would be very similar. The only relevant differences would be for ‘Portuguese’, which would become even 
more significant, for ‘DIA’ and ‘Dist’, both of which would become marginally significant at 10%. The 
same is true for Table 3, which we present in the next sub-section.   22




32.3  31.8  0.084 
(3.17)***  (3.14)***  (3.08)*** 
GDP  2.9e-04  0.0003  7.69e-07 
(4.86)***  (4.82)***  (4.28)*** 
DIA  0.0085  0.0085  2e-05 
(4.69)***  (4.63)***  (4.02)*** 
GDP per capita  0.0003  0.0004  1.14e-06 
(0.08)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Portuguese  382.6  379.9  1.01 
(2.06)**  (2.04)**  (2.04)** 
Spanish  406.4  393.1  1.04 
(3.21)***  (3.12)***  (3.02) 
English  125.3  115.6  0.31 
(1.42)  (1.29)  (1.29) 
Distance  -0.017  -0.017  -4e-05 
(-1.50)  (-1.48)  (-1.48) 
Exports to and from 
Brazil 
3.8e-08  3.93e-08  1.04e-10 
(0.95)  (0.97)  (0.96) 
Constant  -679.4  -673.9  -1.78 
(-4.09)***  (-4.22)***  (-3.75)*** 
       
z-statistics between parentheses 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% 
         
 
4.2 Is multicollinearity a problem? 
 
As we have discussed early on, it is not entirely clear what a summary index such 
as ‘Country political risk’ may really be capturing. One possible question is whether the 
effects  of  risk  can  be  distinguished  from  the  effects  of  being  an  advanced  industrial 
economy, where political risk tends to be lower. In other words, it is possible that there is 
a multicollinearity problem between political risk and GDP pc.  
In Table 3, we display the correlation matrix between the independent variables. 
The correlations suggest the possibility of linear dependence between some variables. For 
example, political risk is indeed highly correlated (.79) with GDP per capita. This is 
particularly relevant because we want to assess the explanatory power of the political risk 
and  to  be  sure  that  effects  of  other  variables  do  not  contaminate  the  estimated   23
coefficients. To be sure, linear dependence between the independent variables leads to an 
increase in the standard errors, which can lead to incorrect non-rejections of the null 
hypothesis. In other words, the statistical relevance of “political risk” is not in question. 
However, it is remains worth to examine whether there is linear dependence between the 
variables and the extent to which it might be affecting the results. 
 
Table 3 ─ Independent variables correlation matrix 
  
Political 
Risk  GDP pc  Portuguese  Spanish  English  Distance  Exports to and 
from Brazil  GDP  DIA 
Political Risk  100                 
GDP pc  79.1  100               
Portuguese  -7  -7.7  100             
Spanish  -8.5  -10.6  -6.9  100           
English  5.9  7  -11.7  -19  100         
Distance  14.8  6.7  -14.5  -43.4  -7.5  100       
Exports to and 
from Brazil 
30  25  -5.1  7.7  0.5  -1.5  100     
GDP  33.2  30  -3.8  -4  6.7  4.1  87.8  100   
DIA  42.1  41  -4.5  -3.6  -7.8  2.7  18  17.9  100 
 
If the independent variables are linearly dependent, at least one of the eigenvalues 
of the matrix X
TX will be zero. If it is not perfect, small eigenvalues indicate strong linear 
dependence. To assess the severity of this problem, we used the condition index test 
(Belsley, 1991), which involves the standardization of the explanatory variables to unit 
variance and the computation of the eigenvalues of the standardized X
TX. The condition 
index is given by , where   is the highest (lowest) eigenvalue. As a 
rule  of  thumb,  Kennedy  (2008)  considers  that  there  is  evidence  in  favor  of  linear 
min max l l ( ) min maxl l  24
dependence between the variables if the index is above 30. Greene (2008) suggests that 
values above 20 may indicate such dependence. However, computation of the condition 
index of our model reveals a value of 9.16. These values are far below the suggested 
lower boundaries, indicating that linear dependence is not a serious problem.  
An alternative approach is to regress each independent variable against all the 
others and then use the R
2 of this auxiliary regression to compute the variance inflation 
factor  (VIF).  As  a  rule,  Kennedy  (2010)  argues  that  there  is  evidence  that  linear 
dependence is a problem if VIF > 10 When we computed the VIF for each independent 
variable, the highest value we observed was 4.76. Again, the evidence suggests that linear 
dependence is not affecting the results.  
Finally,  note  that  the  main  consequences  of  linear  dependence  is  the  high 
sensibility of the estimators to small changes in the sample size, or the chosen variables. 
However, in a previous version of this paper, we only had 113 countries (70 countries 
less) and our data referred to the year of 2001. The results were the same: political risk 
was statistically significant while the estimated coefficients for GDP per capita were not 
statistically significant. 
4.3 Unpacking political risk 
 
Another  interesting  question  concerns  which  of  the  possible  non-economic 
components of the home country political risk is most relevant for FDI. As we have seen 
early on, summary measures of political risk conceivably conflate different aspects of the 
institutional,  political,  and  policy  environment  in  a  particular  country.  One  of  them 
pertains to the level of stability in the institutional environment, i.e, the absence of threats   25
to regime and governmental stability that might seriously destabilize operations by firms, 
the aspect that tended to be emphasized in the seminal studies focusing on home country 
political  risk  (Tallman  1988;  Grosse  and  Trevino  1996).  Other  potentially  relevant 
aspects  concern  governance,  especially  as  it  may  help  creating  a  policy  environment 
favorable to business and investment. This may include, for example, dimensions such as 
corruption (Deichmann 2010), the enforcement of contracts and property rights, and the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation. Finally, regime type – i.e., democracy 
– may also be related to the concept of political risk. Which of these dimensions is most 
consequential for the empirical relationship we have observed in Table 2? 
To  answer  that  question,  we  gathered  several  variables  that  capture  different 
potential dimensions of political risk. One of our major concerns, of course, was to obtain 
measures  of  the  aforementioned  concepts  for  the  largest  possible  number  of  cases  – 
including countries with positive and zero levels of FDI into Brazil - in order to avoid the 
selection bias problems common in the extant literature. Thus, the first two variables 
measure regime type. We use data from Cheibub et al. (2010) to measure “Democracy” 
(coded for 2005), distinguishing countries where the executive and the legislature are 
chosen directly by popular election (or at least indirectly in the case of the executive), 
more than one party competes in the election, and alternation in power has taken place (1) 
from all remaining cases (0). For the same generic purpose, we also used the variable 
“Polity” from the Polity IV 1800-2009 dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2009), which ranges 
from  -10  (Autocratic)  to  10  (Democratic),  capturing  the  constraints  faced  by  the 
executive, the degree of competition and openness in executive recruitment, and political 
competition in a regime. We also use country “Polity” measures for 2005.   26
In order to capture aspects related to political stability and quality of governance, 
we turn to the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2009). 
Six  different  variables  are  available  for  a  large  number  of  countries,  all  of  them 
standardized to range from -2.5 to 2.5. “Voice and accountability” captures a concept 
with  similarities  to  that  of  regime  type,  i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  citizens  are  able  to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. “Political Stability” captures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means. “Government effectiveness” is a measure of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment  to  such  policies.  “Regulatory  quality”  is  related  to  the  ability  of  the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote  private  sector  development.  “Rule  of  law”  relates  to  the  quality  of  contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. And “Control of Corruption” captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain. All these measures were obtained for 2005. 
For almost all variables described above, we have at least 180 country observations. The 
exception is “Polity”, on which we have measures for 155 countries. 
In Table 3, we show the correlations between these variables and “Political risk” 
and reestimations of the model previously presented in Table 2, with two differences. 
First, we drop GDP pc, which he have already shown to be unrelated to FDI. Second, we   27
add each of the variables described above and observe what this inclusion does to the 
coefficient and statistical significance attached to the variable “Political Risk”.
10  
Note,  first,  that  there  are  four  variables  that  are very  strongly  correlated  with 
political risk. Those are not the ones related either with regime type or political stability, 
but  rather  those  most  related  to  regime  performance  and  governance:  Control  of 
Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Government Effectiveness.  
When each of the eight variables is added to the model, we find that the results are 
quite  robust  to  the  introduction  of  these  new  variables.  None  of  them  is  statistically 
significant in any model and in all cases – except one, political risk remains significant 
(at least at 10% level).  
The one exception is, however, very informative. When one includes a measure 
for  ‘Government  Effectiveness’,  then  both  that  variable  and  ‘political  risk’  become 
individually  statistically  non-significant,  while they  are  jointly  highly  significant:  this 
means that the aspect of political risk that is probably most relevant to explain FDI in 
Brazil  is  strongly  correlated  to  government  effectiveness,  i.e.,  the  firms’  policy 
environment in terms of the quality of the state apparatus and policy formulation and 
implementation. 
   
                                                 
10 We only report the results for the Tobit estimation, because the Heckit delivers very similar results. 
Reporting the latter would not add relevant information.   28
 
Table 3 ─ Tobit regression results with several measures of political risk 
  Democracy 
(corr = 0.4) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(corr = 0.77) 
Political 
Stability 
(corr = 0.71) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(corr = 0.92) 
Rule of Law 
(corr = 0.91) 
Control of 
Corruption 
(corr = 0.90) 
Polity 
(corr = 0.44) 
Government 
Effectiveness 




31.5***  23.0**  37.9***  31.9*  26.1*  26.9*  35.0***  13.0 
GDP  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04***  3E-04*** 




52.6  82.3  -48.2  7.36  48.6  41.0  8.3  133.95 
Portuguese  386.7**  356.4*  410.0**  382.0**  382.0**  381.2**  408.9*  385.5** 
Spanish  400.9***  400.7***  406.8***  405.3***  417.2***  411.7***  378.3**  417.9*** 
English  126.3  94.5  147.5  123.4  113.0  114.3  72.3  99.3 




3.83E-08  3.79E-08  3.74E-08  3.78E-08  3.74E-08  3.75E-08  4.10E-08  3.23E-08 
Constant  -725***  -587***  -752***  -672***  -602***  -618***  -728***  -456** 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% 




Existing studies on the influence of political risk on FDI have focused on both 
low-risk developed nations (United States) and higher-risk developing countries (China, 
Mexico, or the Czech Republic). In most cases, however, samples have been limited to 
countries with positive investment flows into the countries under analysis. In this paper, 
we assess the influence of home country political risk on FDI into a high-risk country 
such as Brazil but, unlike previous studies, we use data on a large set of 180 countries,   29
including 100 non-investors, and multiple estimation techniques, such as the Probit, Tobit 
and  Heckit  models,  which  are  appropriate  to  isolate  the  influence  of  home  country 
political risk both on the decision to invest and on the size of FDI flows into Brazil.  
Our  findings,  controlling  for  domestic  output,  size  of  the  market,  language, 
geographic  distance,  and  bilateral  trade,  reveal  that  higher  levels  of  home  country 
political risk are conducive to lower levels of FDI into Brazil. These findings are at odds 
with most studies that focused on the effect of home country risk on foreign investment. 
We also found that the main component of political risk that seems to be driving the 
negative relationship between risk and FDI into Brazil is related neither to regime type 
nor  to  political  stability,  but  rather  to  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and 
implementation. 
Why the different results from most previous studies? On the one hand, there are 
potential methodological reasons behind these findings. By considering a wider sample of 
potential investors, including non-investors, we have addressed potential selection bias 
problems in previous studies. Our results are highly significant and the Tobit and Heckit 
(and the associated selection Probit) estimations delivered, essentially, the same results, 
increasing our confidence in the findings. On the other hand, it is certainly reasonable to 
think that this result may be explained by the different risk profiles and other factors that 
may differentiate cases such as the U.S. from host countries that are higher risk emerging 
markets. Even for firms in high-risk countries, investing in emerging markets that are 
high-risk  themselves  is  not  necessarily  an  optimal strategy,  while  firms  in  developed 
nations might be interested in exploring the risk sharing advantage that derives from the 
lack of intangible assets in emerging markets. Furthermore, we argued, firms in lower   30
risk countries should be more able to access capital markets and to enjoy the benefits of a 
policy environment more favorable to foreign investment. The results seem to support our 
speculations.  
The substantive implications of these findings are potentially quite relevant. First, 
they provide a new insight into the factors that drive investment into Brazil, one of the 
major magnets of foreign investment in the world’s emerging markets in recent years. 
They do so by contributing to the yet scarce literature on country-of-origin factors of FDI, 
precisely in a context – Latin America – where calls for attention to the systematic study 
of  these  factors have  been  frequently  made  (Tuman  2006  and  2009;  Montero  2009). 
Finally, our findings have important implications for policy-makers. Certainly, from the 
point of view of policy-makers in potential host countries, political risk in home countries 
is even less amenable to chance by political fiat than risk in their own contexts. However, 
studies and recommendations in the area of investment facilitation strategies (UNCTAD 
2009a; Ortega and Griffin 2009) have tended to neglect the issue of “targeting”, i.e., 
selecting which potential home countries have the kind of structural features that turn 
their  firms  into  larger  investors.  Investment  facilitation  strategies  in  Brazil  have  also 
suffered  from  a  lack  of  a  strategy  designating  “target-countries”  where  efforts  in 
promotion  and  facilitation  were  more  likely  to succeed  (Sakurai  2004), but  there  are 
recent signs of chance, such as the creation of APEX-Brasil, a governmental-agency in 
charge of attracting international investment. In 2009, APEX worked with a budget of 
more than US$ 260 million, and devoted close to US$ 30 million just in missions and   31
workshops taking place in 13 “priority markets”.
11 Thus, in the global competition for 
foreign investment, governments devote considerable financial and political resources to 
the tools of economic diplomacy, as well as to the establishment of investment and trade 
promotion agencies and their overseas offices. Knowing which countries are more likely 
to invest in a particular country can be of potentially critical importance for governments 
engaged in a pro-active and “targeting” stance in what concerns investment promotion 
and facilitation. 
   
                                                 
11 “Apex-Brasil increases resources provided to investment and exports promotion in 2009”, 18
th December 
2008,  available  at: 
http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/portal_apex/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area=149&tmp.texto=4965.   32
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Appendix 
Country  FDI 2005  Country  FDI 2005  Country  FDI 2005 
United States  4,644.16  Malta  0.08  Korea North  0.00 
Netherlands  3,207.92  Poland  0.06  Kyrgyz Republic  0.00 
Mexico  1,661.18  Kuwait  0.06  Laos  0.00 
France  1,458.41  Guatemala  0.06  Latvia  0.00 
Canada  1,435.32  Bulgaria  0.05  Lesotho  0.00 
Germany  1,269.32  Nigeria  0.05  Lithuania  0.00 
Spain  1,220.43  Dominican Republic  0.05  Macau  0.00 
Australia  926.04  Romania  0.05  Macedonia (FYR)  0.00 
Japan  779.08  Mozambique  0.05  Madagascar  0.00 
Belgium  685.58  Slovenia  0.04  Malawi  0.00 
Italy  345.68  Libya  0.03  Malaysia  0.00 
Switzerland  341.54  Thailand  0.02  Maldives  0.00 
Portugal  334.62  Trinidad & Tobago  0.00  Mali  0.00 
Denmark  239.88  Afghanistan  0.00  Mauritania  0.00 
Uruguay  169.21  Albania  0.00  Micronesia (Fed. States)  0.00 
Korea South  168.01  Algeria  0.00  Moldova  0.00 
Panama  165.56  Armenia  0.00  Mongolia  0.00 
United Kingdom  153.26  Azerbaijan  0.00  Morocco  0.00 
Luxembourg  139.10  Bahrain  0.00  Myanmar  0.00 
Ireland  125.11  Bangladesh  0.00  Namibia  0.00 
Argentina  112.23  Belarus  0.00  Nepal  0.00 
Chile  102.68  Benin  0.00  New Caledonia  0.00 
Bahamas  87.83  Bhutan  0.00  Nicaragua  0.00 
New Zealand  48.13  Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.00  Niger  0.00 
Norway  43.16  Botswana  0.00  Oman  0.00 
Singapore  42.30  Brunei  0.00  Pakistan  0.00 
Bermuda  38.92  Burkina Faso  0.00  Papua New Guinea  0.00 
Sweden  32.91  Burundi  0.00  Philippines  0.00 
Hong Kong  17.45  Cambodia  0.00  Qatar  0.00 
India  7.91  Cameroon  0.00  Rwanda  0.00 
China  7.56  Central African Republic  0.00  Samoa  0.00 
Barbados  6.85  Chad  0.00  Sao Tome & Principe  0.00 
Finland  6.56  Congo  0.00  Saudi Arabia  0.00 
Austria  6.07  Côte d'Ivoire  0.00  Senegal  0.00 
Venezuela  5.56  Croatia  0.00  Serbia and Montenegro  0.00 
Taiwan  3.69 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
(Zaire)  0.00  Sierra Leone  0.00 
South Africa  3.69  Djibouti  0.00  Slovak Republic  0.00 
Israel  3.24  Dominica  0.00  Solomon Islands  0.00 
Bolivia  2.09  El Salvador  0.00  Somalia  0.00 
Ecuador  1.82  Equatorial Guinea  0.00  Sri Lanka  0.00 
Greece  1.64  Eritrea  0.00  St Lucia  0.00 
Colombia  1.58  Estonia  0.00 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines  0.00 
Mauritius  1.57  Ethiopia  0.00  Sudan  0.00   36
Paraguay  1.40  Fiji  0.00  Suriname  0.00 
Marshall Islands  1.39  Gabon  0.00  Swaziland  0.00 
Peru  1.04  Gambia  0.00  Syria  0.00 
Lebanon  0.98  Georgia  0.00  Tajikistan  0.00 
Costa Rica  0.82  Ghana  0.00  Tanzania  0.00 
Antigua and Barbuda  0.45  Grenada  0.00  Togo  0.00 
Russia  0.43  Guinea  0.00  Tonga  0.00 
Angola  0.43  Guinea-Bissau  0.00  Tunisia  0.00 
Liberia  0.41  Guyana  0.00  Turkmenistan  0.00 
Czech Republic  0.32  Haiti  0.00  Uganda  0.00 
Jordan  0.29  Honduras  0.00  Ukraine  0.00 
Belize  0.24  Hungary  0.00  Uzbekistan  0.00 
Cape Verde  0.15  Iceland  0.00  Vanuatu  0.00 
Turkey  0.15  Indonesia  0.00  Vietnam  0.00 
Cuba  0.14  Iran  0.00  Yemen  0.00 
Cyprus  0.11  Iraq  0.00  Zambia  0.00 
United Arab 
Emirates  0.11  Jamaica  0.00  Zimbabwe  0.00 
Egypt  0.11  Kazakhstan  0.00       
Seychelles  0.10  Kenya  0.00       
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